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Congress has recently charged the Federal Communications Commission to establish a 
National Broadband Plan. This paper argues that a customer-centric plan, which puts the 
customer in control of decision-making, will yield the best broadband result for the U.S. 
The Federal government must establish a market infrastructure that encourages 
competition, requires transparency of both network providers and application providers, 
and includes vigorous antitrust enforcement. Competition from wireless broadband is 
present now and will become far more prevalent shortly, on the basis of current and 
announced investment plans. 
 
Regulators must also make available far more licensed spectrum to ensure this 
competition is realized. Calls for regulation in the form of mandated unbundling and 
more unlicensed spectrum are regulatory cul-de-sacs with proven track records of 
failure. Calls for regulatory control of network provider practices (other than 
transparency), such as network neutrality, are misguided. Such decisions are best left to 
customers, who can very well decide for themselves which of the broadband providers 




By the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act,
1 the U.S. Congress tasked the Federal 
Communications Commission (FCC) to create a national broadband plan and deliver the plan to Congress 
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1  See American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (2009). International Journal of Communication 3 (2009)   A National Broadband Plan for Our Future 743 
by February 17, 2010. The FCC has initiated this process by issuing an extensive Notice of Inquiry
2 (NOI) 
outlining the scope of this ambitious task and requesting comment. 
 
It is appropriate to develop such a plan. The FCC has traditionally adopted a careful “hands off” 
policy of encouraging, measuring, and giving advice from the sidelines, but it has not actively regulated 
the broadband
3 industry, nor the Internet more generally.
4 Over the past 15 years, this approach has 
resulted in the cable and telephone companies investing tens of billions of dollars to develop and build a 
broadband network that’s brought high-speed offerings to the consumer. Of course, the success of 
broadband has attracted much attention from politicians, the press, application providers, academic 
pundits, consumer advocates, and think tanks of all stripes, each one expressing its strong opinions about 
“what is wrong” with this industry and how much better we would all be if only we followed their advice. It 
is certainly time for some clear thinking and focused goals that should form the basis of a national 
broadband plan; Congress should be lauded, and the FCC should be encouraged in their efforts to bring 
some rationality and purpose to this enterprise. 
 
The FCC’s NOI poses hundreds of questions and iss u e s  t h a t  i t  p r o p o s e s  t o  a d d r e s s  i n  t h i s  
proceeding, with little indication of a central or common framework for addressing the broadband industry. 
Yet there is a very simple and very powerful single organizing framework which can serve as a public 
policy touchstone for the FCC (and indeed, for all government agencies with a similar Congressional 
mandate): Let the customer decide. A customer-centric approach is particularly appropriate because 
there is no “average” customer. Each customer has unique preferences and “tastes” for broadband, and 
one-size-fits-all regulation poorly serves this diverse array of individual needs.  A national broadband plan 
which is customer-centric, which puts the customer
5 at the center of decision making, is a guarantee of 




                                                 
2  Federal Communications Commission (2009), hereinafter NOI. 
3 The term “broadband” is typically used to describe high-speed, last-mile facilities which connect 
customer’s homes and businesses to the Internet, and that is the meaning I take in this paper. There 
has been recent interest in the “middle mile” problem (NOI, §17), which I address briefly here. 
4  See, for example, FCC Chairman Michael Powell’s (2001) comments. 
5  In the broadband market (and the Internet generally), who the customer is may not be obvious. This is 
a classic “two-sided market,” in which application providers use the Internet to reach retail customers, 
and as such, are customers themselves. A good analogy is the newspaper business, in which both 
readers and advertisers are customers of the newspaper, whose function is to put the two in touch with 
each other. The focus of this paper is primarily, but not exclusively, the retail customer. 
6  The NOI implicitly recognizes that the companies of the private sector have been, and will continue to 
be, the primary developers of broadband infrastructure. While there are a few examples of successful 
local government-funded broadband providers (see NOI, fn 134 ), the rather poor performance of the 
much-touted municipal WiFi ventures suggests that neither local governments nor public infrastructure 
are likely to be the engine of broadband growth. 744 Gerald R. Faulhaber  International Journal of Communication 3(2009) 
There are plenty of self-proclaimed candidates for helping the FCC decide issues that deeply 
affect customers: application providers (such as Google, Microsoft, and Amazon), government regulators 
and bureaucrats, competing network providers (such as AT&T, Verizon, Comcast, and Sprint), resellers, 
consumer advocates, assorted think tanks, law professors, even business school professors. But none of 
these groups, however well-intentioned, should be making the decisions about broadband that impact 
customers; only customers should be making such decisions. It is the role of the FCC (and government 
generally) to ensure that it is customers who make these decisions and, therefore, drive the process of 
broadband expansion, deployment, and adoption, not special interests on any of the many sides of the 
broadband debate. This is the FCC’s opportunity to put the customer center-stage in the broadband wars: 
It must deliver a choice-rich market environment to customers. 
 
This is by no means a call for a laissez-faire, let-the-market-do-it-all approach.  Indeed, this 
concept calls instead for a vigorous but nuanced approach by the FCC and the antitrust agencies, one 
focused on ensuring an array of choices that are compatible with the efficient allocation of resources in the 
marketplace. It is not an approach that substitutes the judgment of regulators or even legislators for the 
judgment of customers in a choice-rich market. It is an approach that ensures that customers have a 
choice-rich marketplace in which to make choices. 
 
There are two key elements in building a choice-rich market environment. 
 
1.  Removing impediments to investment and competitive entry. This includes moving much 
more licensed spectrum into the market via auctions to enable wireless broadband,
7 as well as 
removing right-of-way, franchise, and other government restrictions on deployment of wired 
broadband.
8 Vigorous public and private antitrust enforcement is required to maintain 
competition. 
 
2.  Ensuring that all providers (network providers as well as application providers) are transparent 
in dealing with customers. If customers are to make wise choices, they must be fully informed 
about what they are buying, how much it costs, what services are or are not included, what they 
have access to, what network management methods are in use, and (of course) the privacy of 
their information. 
 
Key to understanding how competitive entry and investment can be encouraged is the idea that, 
with any regulation, requirement, or obligation imposed on an incumbent or entrant network (or 
any other), the provider necessarily increases its costs and thus reduces its incentive to invest 
                                                 
7 Even with the very limited spectrum available to wireless carriers, in 2007, mobile broadband lines 
increased by 28.7 million (46%), or 75% of total broadband net adds in that year (using the current, 
rather lax FCC definition of broadband), suggesting that wireless broadband is perhaps already a larger 
part of the broadband picture than commonly believed. 
8  This suggestion was mooted in 2006 in Bailey, et al. (2006) (present author is a signatory). International Journal of Communication 3 (2009)   A National Broadband Plan for Our Future 745 
or to competitively enter the market.  No matter how well intentioned, such regulations will reduce 
competition; reduce investment; and therefore, reduce customers’ choice.
9  
 
With competition comes choice; with transparency comes informed choice. The American people 
can decide for themselves whether they want broadband or not,
10 whether they want their network 
provider to block viruses and manage traffic or not, and whether they want their application providers to 
sell their buying profiles to third parties or not. We who are regulators, providers, advocates, or various 
“experts” should not be making those choices for customers. We should be creating a choice-rich market 
environment that empowers customers to make their own decisions.
11 
 
Of concern to many is that broadband may not be available in poor and/or rural communities; if 
so, perhaps some form of supplier subsidy (such as through the Universal Service Fund
12) is appropriate. I 
believe that provider subsidies are largely ineffective and certainly inefficient. But if subsidies to rural or 
the poor are needed, then the subsidies should go directly to customers, not to providers. Customers in 
need of support could be given a monthly allotment (similar to LifeLine telephone service) which they 
could use only for broadband; if the demand for broadband in a rural area would not normally be sufficient 
to justify a broadband buildout, such a customer-direct subsidy could well boost demand sufficiently 
enough for suppliers to offer service. Again, the focus should be on empowering customers. 
 
The framework espoused in this paper is straightforward: let government do what it does best, 
which is to create a market infrastructure that fosters competition and transparency. Let the private sector 
do what it does best: invest and innovate to serve customer needs better than their competitors. Let the 
customers do what they do best: make choices that lead to the best outcomes for them and thus for all 




A fundamental tenet of the U.S. economy is customer choice in competitive markets, a precept 
that has created the greatest economy in the world. These competitive markets are virtually ubiquitous: 
Even though I live in rural Delaware, I have five supermarkets within five miles of my home, each offering 
the basics plus something different in the way of food that distinguishes it from its competitors. I get the 
                                                 
9  For an early analytic treatment of broadband market structure and the impact of regulatory obligations 
on carriers, see Faulhaber and Hogendorn (2000).  
10 It is reasonable for government policies to consider whether there are barriers, such as digital literacy, 
that may be constraining consumer choices, but it should not be a national policy to make everyone 
take broadband services, like it or not. 
11 Of course, every economist knows that, while competitive markets and customer sovereignty can lead 
to socially desirable outcomes, this may not be the case in the presence of market failures, such as 
externalities or network effects. Despite the claims of some (see Crandall, Jackson, & Singer, 2003), the 
empirical evidence that there are direct network effects in broadband is quite thin. 
12 A much-criticized and costly subsidy program; see, for example, Thomas Hazlett (2006). 
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choice of where I want to shop based on my preferences and what I consider important. The same is true 
of computers, automobiles, real estate, clothing, restaurants . . . and on and on.  No one tells me what I 
must buy; if I don’t like cauliflower, I don’t need to buy it. The customer is sovereign, and in competitive 
markets, this leads to efficient outcomes.
13 
 
Is there a role for government? Absolutely; local health departments ensure the food I buy in 
supermarkets and restaurants is fresh and healthy, the FDA ensures it is well-labeled, fraud laws and 
“lemon” laws protect me, the FTC makes sure the products I buy are appropriately labeled so I know what 
I’m buying, and the Department of Justice Antitrust Division (as well as private parties) safeguards 
against illegal monopolies. 
 
So far, so boring. This is, after all, simply the way we all live our lives. Is there a lesson to be 
learned from these prosaic examples? In each case, the government provides the structure, the market 
infrastructure, in which a competitive market can develop and provide customers with the rich choices 
we all enjoy. In each case, it’s the private sector that provides customers the choice while operating within 
the market infrastructure the government has established. But the government is not offering the choices, 
nor is it telling firms what they must and must not sell (except as noted above). The private sector is 
absolutely best at competing with better prices, better service, higher quality, new innovations, and 
exploring customers’ preferences — far better than the government will ever be. But government is 
absolutely best at setting the rules that ensure that markets will give customers the best possible choices. 
 
Essential to this vision is that markets really are competitive, and that customers know what they 
are choosing. Without these two pillars, customer choice is a sham. Note that both the government and 
the private sector are essential to creating and exploiting the market infrastructure for competition to 
work. 
 
An example of how the FCC got this right comes from the initial allocation and auction of PCS 
licenses for digital cellular mobile telephony. The FCC allocated 160 MHz in each market and then held its 
first auction to determine which firms would get the spectrum. Prior to the initial auctions, the FCC 
adopted a spectrum cap so as to allow for more entry.
14 As the wireless industry evolved from this start, 
competition took hold, and, today, the wireless marketplace is robustly competitive.  In essence, the FCC 
established the initial market infrastructure, but the private sector provided choices to customers. This is 
the model upon which to build a national broadband plan. 
 
What Have We Today? 
 
                                                 
13 Of course, not all markets can be competitive; in the event of market failures, efficiency may not be the 
outcome of customer choice. In fact, the following paragraph deals with two potential market failures: 
information asymmetries and “unearned” monopolies, and it notes the role of government in ensuring 
these market failures do not interfere with the operation of markets. 
14 The spectrum cap was eliminated, effective on January 1, 2003; see Federal Registry (2002). International Journal of Communication 3 (2009)   A National Broadband Plan for Our Future 747 
Before considering how to achieve a choice-rich broadband market environment, I first outline 
what the industry looks like today, because this will be the foundation upon which the national broadband 
plan will be built. Here are the salient features: 
 
•  As a result of the billions of dollars invested by the private sector in broadband Internet facilities, 
most Americans have at least two choices of wireline broadband providers,
15 which are usually 
the local telephone company and the local cable company.
16 Many who object to the practices of 
broadband companies focus only on the two wireline competitors, pointing to this limited 
competition as the root cause of their issues. Simply put, limited competition cannot deliver a 
choice-rich market environment to customers. This becomes the basis of calls for regulation. 
 
•  The broadband industry is about a decade old, but it has already provided quite extensive 
networks, as measured by households reached (or passed). As a  predominantly wireline network 
industry, this measure is particularly important, as only residential customers whose homes are 
passed by a broadband-capable line can buy the service. As of 2008, 92% of American 
households could purchase cable modem service, and 71% of American households could 
purchase DSL, both of which are recognized as true broadband technologies. It is possible that 
some small number of DSL-passed households are not passed by cable, suggesting that the total 
households passed by at least one wireline broadband provider is between 92% and 95%. It also 
suggests that the number of households that are passed by two broadband providers is between 
68% and 71%.  Figure 1 is a chart of wireline broadband penetration for both cable and DSL, 






                                                 
15 It is important to keep in mind that “broadband” is not synonymous with High Speed Internet (HSI) 
access.  Broadband is simply a high bandwidth transmission facility that can be used for HSI access, but 
can also be used by its owner for its own information transmission, or to provide a service to customers 
other than HSI.  For example, most cable firms use their own proprietary broadband networks to carry 
VoIP telephone calls rather than sending these calls over the Internet, which they believe gives them 
more control over the quality of service their customers receive. Of course, the VoIP calls of non-cable 
firms, such as Vonage, are carried over the Internet. However, the term broadband is often used to 
mean HSI access, and the policy concerns over broadband are really policy concerns about HSI access. 
16 This is a simplification. As discussed below in detail, wireless broadband (3G) services are currently 
widely available. Moreover, there are municipalities that have built their own broadband, and WISPs 
(wireless ISPs) serve a substantial number of rural areas.  Although, a few years ago, municipal WiFi 
was quite popular, most of these systems have shut down, although a few remain. Some satellite DBS 
operators provide broadband, and in many rural areas, they have a powerful presence. Verizon also 
markets a fiber service, FIOS, which accounts for a substantial share of broadband customers in many 
high-income markets. 748 Gerald R. Faulhaber  International Journal of Communication 3(2009) 
 
 
                            Figure 1.  U.S. Wireline Broadband Penetration. 
 
      
     Source: SNL Kagan, Broadband Technology, various years 
 
•  The actual uptake of broadband is rather less impressive, which has led to calls that the U.S. has 
fallen behind much of the developed world in broadband penetration (usually taken to mean 
broadband subscribers per 100 people).
17 As of December 2008, 61% of American households 
subscribed to a wireline broadband provider. Figure 2 is a chart of how broadband subscriptions 
have grown since 2000. 
 
•  Note that the growth of broadband subscriptions is declining, even though there are many 
households for which broadband is available that have not yet purchased it. A salient fact that 
helps explain this seeming anomaly is that the number of U.S. households with at least one 
                                                 
17 There is a veritable cottage industry in interpreting and critiquing the OECD comparison numbers, which 
I feel no need to review. The best of these reviews is Atkinson, et al. (2008). The authors develop a 
rather more sensible index of broadband development, but still find that the U.S. remains in the middle 
of the international pack. A more recent analysis of the OECD numbers is Cleland (2009a). International Journal of Communication 3 (2009)   A National Broadband Plan for Our Future 749 
personal computer in the home is 74%;
18 since a personal computer is generally a necessity for 
using a broadband connection, this sets an upper bound on broadband penetration. We return to 
this point below. 
 
 
                                       Figure 2. U.S. Broadband Subscription Growth.  
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Source: NCTA and SNL Kagan 
 
•  With two main players in the wireline broadband market, one might expect a relaxed view to 
competing with the “other” broadband provider. That does not appear to be the case; there is 
evidence of rather brisk, rivalrous behavior in this market: 
 
o  Customers receive weekly (at least) notices of broadband “special deals” with discounted 
prices and/or increases in advertised bandwidth. Price and service rivalry appears 
robust. 
 
o  The two primary broadband providers have worked to differentiate themselves; cable 
has (on average) somewhat higher prices but somewhat greater bandwidth than DSL, 
                                                 
18 See Consumer Electronics Association (2007).  750 Gerald R. Faulhaber  International Journal of Communication 3(2009) 
which matches the capabilities of their technologies. Verizon’s FiOS service has higher 
prices and higher speeds.   
 
o  Both providers have moved to bundle services such as “triple play” telephony, video, 




o  Investment in new technologies, network engineering, software, and system architecture 
by both players is substantial. Verizon is aggressively rolling out FIOS, a fiber-to-the-
home technology that brings substantially more bandwidth to its retail offerings than 
cable can currently offer. In their competitive response, cable firms are rolling out 
DOCSIS 3.0.  Comcast, for example, reportedly plans to bring DOCSIS 3.0 to 65% of its 
footprint in 2009, and Cablevision has similar plans throughout 100% of its footprint
20 — 
technology introduced specifically to compete with FIOS. In turn, Verizon responded to 
DOCSIS 3.0 by lowering its price on 50 Mb/s service by $20/month. 
 
o  The very rapid deployment of wireless broadband provides additional rivalry within this 
industry, even in its 3G incarnation. The latest FCC numbers put mobile wireless at 19% 




•  Although there is undoubted rivalrous behavior between the two market players and the resulting 
level of differentiation and choice, the national broadband plan should obviously strive for more, 
to the extent that it is economically justified and desired by customers. Criticism of the 
broadband market seems largely based on perceived market power of a market with two principal 
competitors. Advocate arguments that this could potentially limit the openness of the Internet 
that has led to great technological change and innovation, that restrictions on what Web sites can 
be visited or any such business arrangements violate strict non-discrimination, that network 
neutrality is required to counter this perceived market power, all stem from the perception that 
the limited competition among broadband facilities providers is potentially injurious to the 
American people. Further, critics contend that broadband providers have been less than 
forthcoming with information about performance, service and terms and conditions, and they 
have called for greater transparency.   
 
While the current industry structure has laid a very solid foundation for a national broadband plan 
for the future, it is not without problems. As a policy issue, it is unlikely that the FCC and Congress will be 
willing to continue with the current, largely unregulated industry without examining how best to maintain 
and enhance competition with the two existing major providers in most markets. The central issue of this 
                                                 
19 DSL is not well-suited to the transmission of high-quality video; typically, telephone companies offer to 
bundle satellite DBS video programming as part of their triple play. 
20 See Murph (2009).  
21 See Federal Communications Commission (2008a).  International Journal of Communication 3 (2009)   A National Broadband Plan for Our Future 751 
proceeding is how to fix this problem: Can the FCC create a market infrastructure that facilitates 




Competition?  What Competition? 
 
Competition among broadband platform providers has always been the Holy Grail of broadband 
policy. If customers had, say, a half-dozen facilities-based broadband providers vying for their business, 
they would indeed be in a choice-rich market environment, and we could count on competition to sort out 
what customers really valued. Advocates of network neutrality would learn whether or not customers 
valued network neutrality, because if they did, then some provider would adopt net neutrality to gain 
customer acceptance, and other providers would be driven to do the same. If customers did not value net 
neutrality, it would not appear in the market. If a small portion of dedicated customers were really 
interested in net neutrality (possibly willing to pay a premium for it), then a niche broadband provider 
would enter in order to serve this profitable market.
23 
 
But years of failed attempts to bring additional platform competition to this market has led to 
disappointment and disillusionment with the idea of platform competition, leading some to suggest that 
some form of regulatory unbundling or mandated wholesale should be adopted to provide expanded 
competition. Astute industry expert Robert Atkinson, in his review of broadband competition, asserts that 
 
. . . the Washington consensus in favor of more broadband competition ignores the fact 
that broadband displays natural monopoly or duopoly characteristics. Because of the 
nature of the broadband industry, there are significant tradeoffs between more 
competition and the goals of efficiency, innovation, lower prices, and higher speeds and 
broader deployment. (Atkinson, 2009) 
 
                                                 
22 The central issue of this proceeding is not that the U.S. ranks 15
th among OECD nations in broadband 
penetration. While this ranking seems to have energized public debate about broadband, there is no 
evidence whatsoever that this impacts or reflects either the well-being of American customers and 
citizens or the technical leadership of the U.S. 
23 An analogy from the wireless industry is instructive. Advocates of net neutrality have ported these ideas 
to wireless, demanding that wireless carriers should accept any devices (that met standards) the 
customer brings, rather than require the customer to buy the carriers’ devices (see Wu, 2007). In fact, 
two wireless carriers (Sprint/Nextel and T-Mobile) have rather liberal “bring your own phone” rules, 
compared to Verizon Wireless (although this has changed recently). Customers therefore have choice 
with respect to “wireless Carterphone,” and yet this has not caused a rush of customers from Verizon to 
either of the two (much smaller) carriers. If “wireless Carterphone” really mattered a great deal to 
customers, they would flock to the providers that supplied this feature, and there is no market-based 
evidence that they have done so. We can only conclude that, if “wireless Carterphone” matters to 
customers, it doesn’t very much; they have the choice, and they have chosen. 752 Gerald R. Faulhaber  International Journal of Communication 3(2009) 
In one of the earliest statements of this pessimism concerning platform competition, I co-
authored a game-theoretic, empirically based analysis of the emerging broadband industry and predicted 
that the market equilibrium consisted of two, or at most three, broadband providers (Faulhaber & 
Hogendorn, op. cit.), assuming the network technologies and costs then current. 
 
The despair of ever supporting more than two broadband pipes into the home appears justified. If 
this truly is a natural duopoly, is there no hope for platform competition? I assert that, in fact, not only is 
platform competition not dead, it is alive and well today, with actual broadband providers in the market 
offering service, and there are plenty of them. We have simply not focused on one of the world’s most 
dynamic industries, mobile telecommunications, an industry which seems to have a problem being taken 
seriously, even though its are now the dominant electronic devices in the U.S. and the world today. There 
are 21 wireless carriers that serve more than 100,000 customers;
24 all but three offer 3G data services, 
such as EDGE, UMTS, and EV-DO Rev A, which offer downstream bandwidths in excess of 1-1.5 Mbps. 
These bandwidths are low relative to cable and fiber, but they are comparable to low-end DSL offerings, 
and they are far higher than traditional dial-up.   
 
Clearly, today’s wireless 3G broadband delivers mobility but lower speeds than either cable or 
high-end DSL. But is it really broadband? Don’t we really want the blazing speeds of DOCSIS 3.0 or FIOS? 
Some have argued that, since wireless 3G broadband is slow, it really doesn’t count as broadband, that it 
cannot substitute for wired broadband at all.
25 Well, if you are a gamer, or if you wish to watch HD 
television over the Internet, then yes, you really want the blazing speeds. But suppose you want to watch 
a live traffic cam video feed or a YouTube video clip, or download a colleague’s 100-page paper? My 
personal test of an EV-DO Rev A connection confirms that yes, you really can do these tasks successfully 
over a 3G connection.
26  No, it is not a perfect substitute for a high-speed wired broadband connection, 
but yes, it is good enough for what most of us want to do today. 
 
Of greater interest, however, are the current investments of wireless firms to both realize 
significantly higher speeds and focus greater attention on laptop computers. Upgrades to 4G protocols, 
such as LTE and WiMAX, are planned, some as early as 2010. For example, Verizon Wireless has 
committed to a commercial rollout of LTE in “the second half of 2010,” with a “nationwide buildout 
complete in late 2013 or early 2014.” 
27 Verizon Wireless is promising peak bandwidth of 50-60 Mbps and 
average user speeds of 8-12 Mbps, performance comparable to today’s high-end cable.
28  Verizon Wireless 
                                                 
24 For a list of U.S. wireless operators, see Wikipedia (2009a), which includes technologies used, 
subsidiaries, number of subscribers, and company Web site. 
25 See Turner (2009).  Note the differences in wireless broadband data quoted in this report relative to the 
Federal Communications Commission (2008a) data, referenced in fn 21, supra. 
26 Consider this automotive analogy: If you own a Ferrari and I own a Ford Taurus, you will certainly win 
a n y  G r a n d  P r i x  r a c e s  w e  b o t h  e n t e r .  B u t  i f  w e  a r e driving the family to church over well-policed 
highways, then your Ferrari is no better than my Taurus. 
27 See Segan (2009).  
28 Motorola’s demo of LTE vs. EV-DO suggests that, in practice, LTE is over 12 times faster than EV-DO.  
See the demo at Motorola (2009). International Journal of Communication 3 (2009)   A National Broadband Plan for Our Future 753 
sees this, initially, as “a laptop play,”
29 focused on personal computers rather than mobile devices; this 
clearly would provide direct platform competition with today’s broadband providers. Other wireless 
operators, such as AT&T Mobility, T-Mobile, and MetroPCS have also announced plans to deploy LTE,
30 
though none are as advanced as Verizon Wireless. Additionally, Sprint/Nextel and its recent acquisition 
Clearwire are currently deploying a WiMAX 4G broadband network, now operational in Portland, OR, 
Atlanta, GA, and Baltimore, MD (under the Xohm brand). Current downstream speed is 2-4 Mbps; the firm 
is “. . . expected to reach 80 metropolitan areas and 120 million people by the end of 2009”
31 under the 
brand name “Clear.”  
 
             The deployment of LTE does require some investment in antennas and hardware, but virtually all 
wireless companies already possess most of the infrastructure they need: cell towers, backhaul facilities, 
switching, and antennas. The amount of capital expenditures necessary to become full-fledged broadband 
operators is not trivial, but it is far less than stringing wires or fiber underground. Since most wireless 
carriers are already 3G capable, entry costs to higher bandwidths are likely to be relatively low. For 
example, Sprint expects to invest $3 billion upgrading its existing network to accommodate WiMAX in 100 
metropolitan areas with total population of 100 million (approximately 39 million households).
32  By 
contrast, Verizon will invest $23 billion by 2010 to bring FIOS past 18 million households.
33 
 
Wireless is a consistently underestimated industry; many claimed, for example, that wireless 
voice was a complement to, rather than a substitute for, wireline voice telephony. But today, 20% of 
wireless subscribers do not have a wireline phone, and for them it is a substitute, regardless of what the 
pundits say. Let’s not make the same mistake again with wireless broadband: It’s here and it’s real.
34 
 
Wireless broadband has clearly changed the economics of broadband entry since our initial 
analysis (see Faulhaber & Hogendorn,  op. cit.). The existence of many wireless firms offering 3G 
broadband, plus the current ramp-up of 4G broadband (competitive with current wireline broadband 
offerings), suggests that competition in this area is not only possible, it is happening now. It is quite 
realistic to envision at least four national wireless firms offering broadband service across most of the 
nation’s metro areas in four years’ time. It is this competition, and only this competition, that can deliver 
the choice-rich market environment to customers that must be the objective of any public-interest-based 
national broadband plan. 
 
What can be done by the FCC to encourage this new intermodal competition?  What policies 
would speed up the process of entry and ensure adequate bandwidth for wireless to be competitive in 
                                                 
29 See Marek (2009).  
30 See Wikipedia article, op. cit. 
31 See Clearwire (2009).  
32 See Wikipedia article, op. cit. 
33 See Wilen (2007). Note that “households passed” is not the same as “households that subscribe.”   
Currently, 24% of households passed become FIOS Internet subscribers. 
34 For those keeping score on how the U.S. is doing relative to other countries, Neilson Mobile (2008) 
reports that the U.S. leads 16 other countries in mobile Internet usage penetration. 754 Gerald R. Faulhaber  International Journal of Communication 3(2009) 
price and service? Fortunately, the answer is both easy and obvious: get much more licensed spectrum 
into the market. Only the FCC (working with NTIA) can make this happen, and the relative scarcity of 
licensed spectrum is the single greatest barrier to entry by wireless firms into the broadband market. The 
need for new spectrum is evident, as is its scarcity. In Auction 73, Verizon Wireless (“Cellco”) paid $4.6 
billion for 22 MHz of C-block spectrum covering the continental U.S., spectrum it intends to use for 
deploying LTE. Because the FCC has been parsimonious with licensed spectrum, it is unnecessarily scarce 
and costly. It is, quite simply, the most significant entry barrier to entry by wireless carriers into high-
bandwidth, high-speed Internet access comparable to wireline broadband. 
 
While this may seem like bad news, it is actually good news. Since the FCC is the barrier to entry, 
the FCC can fix it, and it can do it by itself, on its own authority! The very first step that has now been 
recently completed is clearing the 700 MHz band via the DTV transition, a much-delayed action now 
complete. Both Verizon Wireless and AT&T Mobility plan on using the 700 MHz spectrum they have already 
bought to offer 4G broadband services in 2010, so this action is especially timely for wireless broadband. 
Additionally, the FCC needs to identify the total amount of licensed spectrum needed to achieve the 
objective of a competitive broadband market, both now and for the future. 
 
How much spectrum might this be? Without in any way prejudicing the outcome of a careful 
analysis by the Commission, the industry, and independent experts, it is worth noting that the 
Commission has already set aside a very large swath of unlicensed spectrum specifically for the purpose of 
broadband provision, referred to as U-NII, which provides a total of 550 MHz specifically for high speed 
data services. In addition, the FCC recently allocated a total of 508 MHz in the TV “whitespace” for 
unlicensed use, specifically intended for wireless broadband provision. “. . . we anticipate that allowing 
unlicensed operation in the TV bands will benefit wireless Internet service providers (WISPs) by extending 
the service range of their operations.” 
35 The Commission apparently believes that wireless high-speed 
data services are worth at least 1 GHz of unlicensed spectrum. I infer, then, that 1 GHz of licensed 
s p e ct r um  i s  a f a i r  e s t i m a t e  o f  h o w  m u ch  s h o ul d  b e  m ad e  a v a i l a b l e  a t  a u ct i on  a t  t h e  e a rl i e st  p o s si b le 
moment. The longer the FCC delays in removing this barrier to entry, the longer the American people will 
be denied the choice-rich market environment in broadband services that they need and deserve. 
 
Wireless broadband is clearly challenging the existing cable-DSL broadband paradigm, and it 
looks on track to deliver multiple competitors. But this is no overnight fix; development of full competition 
will take the better part of five years to deliver the choice-rich market environment the American people 
need. No doubt, a part of that delay will be the time it takes the FCC to move a very substantial amount of 
spectrum to auction, so there is no time to waste. It appears that the technology of true wireless 
broadband is upon us, and it would be great if the spectrum were available for license now. It is not, but 
the FCC needs to get this spectrum to market quickly to remove this very large barrier to entry for 
wireless broadband. Again, this is not an overnight fix, but even that which happens during the transition 
to full competition is critically important, as is discussed below. 
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But if the FCC moves the spectrum to market via auction, will private firms actually deploy it 
quickly enough to provide the needed competition? The evidence suggests that they will. The willingness 
of Verizon Wireless to publicly commit to an aggressive buildout of its 700 MHz spectrum for LTE 
broadband before it has even taken possession of the spectrum it has paid for speaks to the urgency that 
at least one large firm feels regarding wireless broadband. Similarly, the AWS auction in 2006, in which 90 
MHz of licenses were sold to the private sector, saw the AWS winners deploy this spectrum for 3G services 
in a timely fashion. T-Mobile built out its 3G service using AWS spectrum to 130 U.S. cities with a total 
population of 107 million people by year end 2008.
36 MetroPCS has also deployed 3G services using AWS 
in four major metro markets with 13 million people.
37 Leap Wireless, via Cricket, is offering 3G services 
using AWS spectrum as a computer broadband play, and by year end 2008, it addressed markets totaling 
30 million people.
38 This market deployment of 3G services, all within two years after the AWS auction, 
suggests that the smaller players are willing to deploy broadband services as the spectrum becomes 
available. The evidence shows that, when the FCC moves licensed spectrum for broadband, the private 
sector will respond. 
 
Some argue that wireless can never achieve the blazing speeds of fiber optics to the home, and 
they point to Japan and Korea, with speeds of 50-100 Mbps over fiber. Can wireless ever achieve those 
speeds? And does it have to, in order to meet customer needs?  The answer to the first question is simple: 
With enough spectrum available to wireless broadband providers, any data speeds that customers demand 
can, and will, be provided at reasonable prices. There are two critical parts to this statement. The first is 
“with enough spectrum available.” The current amount of licensed spectrum that the FCC has made 
available to the wireless industry falls far short of what is needed to meet this goal. I predict that, when 
4G services first roll out, they will be fairly expensive and targeted at corporations and mobile 
professionals who both need and can pay for high-bandwidth wireless. There is simply not enough 
spectrum presently available to wireless carriers for ultra-high speed wireless broadband (4G and beyond) 
to be a mass market commodity.  But if the FCC is aggressive in making much more spectrum available 
quickly, scarcity will become abundance, prices will drop, and truly high speed wireless broadband will be 
possible. The second critical part is “speeds that customers demand.” Under a customer-centric broadband 
plan, 100 Mbps service will develop only to the extent that customers actually want it and are willing to 
pay for it. And it is not likely that demand for this level of product will ever be large. There will be a 
substantial minority of gamers, video consumers, and downloaders who will consume large amounts of 
bandwidth, but most of us won’t, and we won’t want to pay for it. Very high bandwidth broadband will be 
a niche market, albeit a rather profitable one. We can learn a lesson from the PC industry, in which the 
growth through the 1990s was driven by speed: Everyone wanted a faster processor, faster video cards, 
faster busses, etc. Today, for most of us, computers are fast enough for what we want to do.  There is still 
a niche market for very high-end PCs with quad processors boasting teraflop capabilities for gaming, 
number crunching, and other compute-intensive activities. But for most of us, mass market computers are 
fast enough; today’s PC customer is increasingly focused on value rather than raw speed. Tomorrow’s 
mainstream broadband customer will no doubt be the same. 
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The lesson is very straightforward: if the FCC gets sufficient spectrum into the hands of carriers 
who can and will provide high-speed wireless broadband, then the only limit on speeds is what customers 
demand. And it is customers that will carry the day, not the pundits and gurus who think they know what 
our broadband future ought to be.  
 
“Get sufficient spectrum into the hands of carriers who can, and will, provide high-speed wireless 
broadband.” This policy recommendation
39 puts the FCC at the center of substantially increasing 
competition in the broadband market, and it does it by establishing a market infrastructure (increased 
spectrum), but not by making choices that are rightfully within the domain of customers. A decision to 
increase licensed spectrum substantially is an enabling action, one that lets the private sector do its best 
to serve customers, while also ensuring that competition protects customers against anticompetitive 
behavior and results in substantially increased customer choice. The FCC has the critical role of enabling 
customers to have the widest range of private-sector broadband choices. 
 
A Regulatory Cul-de-Sac: Unlicensed Spectrum 
 
The Commission has been actively and publicly advocating unlicensed spectrum for broadband in 
both urban and rural contexts for well over a decade. It is with the best of intentions that the FCC sought 
to use its spectrum authority to encourage entry into the broadband market. Presumably, it is with these 
same best intentions that the FCC has opened the TV whitespace to unlicensed broadband. The generosity 
of the FCC in creating unlicensed spectrum can be seen by comparing the total amount of spectrum in the 
U-NII bands and the whitespace bands (1,058 MHz)
40 to the total bandwidth allocated to wireless 
telephony, one of the most vibrant growth industries in the world, which must operate on a mere 409.5 
MHz.
41 From this small amount of spectrum, U.S. wireless carriers transport 2.1 trillion minutes of voice 
traffic and offer 3G broadband, as well. 
 
Given that unlicensed broadband spectrum has over twice the bandwidth of licensed CMRS 
spectrum, one might expect that the U.S. would be awash in wireless broadband, brought to us by 
Wireless ISPs (WISPs) eagerly snapping up this “free” spectrum. The U-NII spectrum has been available 
for over five years, and some has been available for over a decade, so WISPs certainly have had the time 
to learn about it. And yet, it seems to be quite difficult to find any WISPs operating in the U-NII band.
42 I 
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available.  On July 8, 2009, the Senate Telecom Subcommittee introduced a bill requiring the FCC to 
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spectrum to wireless carriers for broadband services (Gallant, 2009). 
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41 CTIA (2009). 
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did find one such WISP: Etheric Networks, operating in Mountain View, CA. However, this may not be as 
puzzling as it might seem: 
 
Interference caused the majority of unlicensed wireless services to have much higher 
error rates and interruptions than equivalent wired or licensed wireless networks . . . 
This caused growth to slow, customers to cancel, and many operators to rethink their 
business model. 
 
[In 2005, t]he better capitalized operators began reducing their focus on unlicensed and 
instead focused on licensed systems, as the constant fluctuations in signal quality 
caused them to have very high maintenance costs.
43 (Wikipedia, 2009b) 
 
Interference, of course, is the bane of unlicensed spectrum; users of all unlicensed spectrum are 
warned that they must accept all interference (but cause none themselves), which severely constrains its 
use in such applications as, well, commercial broadband.  Radio theory meets wireless broadband 
practice; it appears that, despite the FCC’s largesse with unlicensed spectrum, experience shows that it 
does not work. Unlicensed spectrum is a regulatory cul-de-sac for wireless broadband. Experience clearly 
shows that, for wireless broadband, licensed spectrum is wildly successful, and unlicensed spectrum is 
wildly unsuccessful. The FCC continues to go to the well of unlicensed for wireless broadband, and it 
continues to come up dry. It’s time to try something with a proven track record: licensed spectrum. 
 
Again, the FCC is at the center of increasing competition by allocating its spectrum for 
broadband, as market experience has demonstrated is the most effective model for eliciting broadband 
development. Not doing the wrong thing is at least as important as doing the right thing. By switching its 
emphasis from unlicensed to licensed spectrum, the FCC will be following a data-driven strategy for 
success. 
 
Other Means of Encouraging Platform Competition 
 
Wireless broadband is more than simply a promising technology; it is already here and ready for 
deployment. But the FCC should also remove barriers to entry for other wireline platforms. In an earlier 
paper (Faulhaber, 2003a), I noted that municipal governments have tended to place barriers to entry for 
wireline broadband providers, including excessive fees for installation and ongoing revenue diversions. The 
FCC has the authority to mitigate any remaining barriers, and it should act to do so. Additionally, wireline 
broadband providers require rights of way under streets, along highways, and in conduits to physically 
locate their fiber or wire. Recently, Rep. Anna Eshoo (D-CA) introduced the Broadband Conduit 
                                                                                                                                                 
used outdoors, and the DFS requirements (for radar avoidance) make much of it unusable.  The portion 
that is usable by WISPs is quite crowded and thus interference-prone.  Despite the rhetoric and the 
name, this spectrum is not dedicated to broadband, and WISPs must contend with other devices that 
use the spectrum (private communication, Brett Glass, owner of LARIAT, a WISP in Laramie, WY, May 
21, 2009). 
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Deployment Act (2009), which would require the Federal government to install plastic conduit suitable for 
housing fiber links along every Interstate highway as it is repaired or rebuilt.
44 This may well help address 
the “middle mile” problem, in which ISPs, particularly in rural areas, face high costs of backhaul to carry 
their Internet traffic to the nearest Internet POP from incumbent network carriers who may face little 
competition. Helping to reduce the cost of installing backhaul fiber can certainly help small-town WISPs to 
be viable competitors. 
 
A few years ago, municipal WiFi was all the rage, starting in Philadelphia, PA. Suddenly, 
municipalities around the country wanted to jump on the WiFi bandwagon. Today, we probably have more 
papers discussing the failure of municipal WiFi than municipal WiFi customers. Although the technology of 
unlicensed WiFi has been a success in its intended use within the home and office, it was not very good at 
something it was not designed to do: providing last-mile broadband connectivity. 
 
Other municipal broadband projects have been successful, but the number is small. Lafayette, 
LA, and Burlington, VT, appear to be success stories, as noted in the FCC’s NOI. Under special 
circumstances, municipal entry into broadband may succeed, but it appears this will be a rather small 
market niche.  
 
Generally, I do not expect another wireline carrier to provide broadband to a significant fraction 
of the U.S. population. As I noted in my previous analysis,
45 the rather high fixed costs of establishing a 
wireline broadband network limit the number of such competitors. But this analysis does not apply to 
wireless broadband networks because the fixed network costs are far lower than for wireline. This is not to 
say that the FCC should not attend to clearing away the municipal underbrush of entry barriers to wireline 
carriers, but it is to say that our expectations of wireline broadband entry should not be high. 
 
Competition by Any Other Name . . . Another Regulatory Cul-de-Sac 
 
As discussed above, the general policy consensus regarding broadband has been that, while 
platform competition would b e  g r e a t ,  w e  c a n ’ t  e x p e c t  i t ,  s o  w e  m u s t  r e s i g n  o u r s e l v e s  t o  h a v i n g  t w o  
platforms: cable and telco (DSL for now, with more FTTH or FTTN coming to market).
46 The facts and 
conclusions of the previous sections demonstrate that this is false, that additional platform competition 
from wireless broadband is well on its way, and that this competition will lead to the choice-rich market 
environment that is the Holy Grail of broadband policy. But the policy discussion in some quarters has 
m o v e d  a w a y  f r o m  p l a t f o r m  c o m p e t i t i o n  t o  m a n d a t e d  p l a t f o r m  s h a r i n g .  I f  t h e r e  w e r e  t o  b e  o n l y  t w o  
platforms, public policy should require that these platforms must be shared by non-owner ISPs, a policy 
which implies mandated wholesaling of the physical platforms, sometimes called unbundling or line-
sharing. In this way, advocates say, we can have robust competition at the ISP level, if not at the platform 
level. They point to France, Germany, and Japan as models for the success of unbundling and suggest that 
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the U.S. should adopt the same approach. Countries that unbundle, it is implied, do better than the U.S. 
in broadband penetration, and they are therefore worthy to emulate. As it turns out, the implication is 
false. Some countries that mandate unbundling do better than the U.S., but some do worse, such as Italy, 
Spain, and Ireland, so unbundling is not the panacea it is so often claimed to be. 
 
But there is a darker side to unbundling: the owners of the conduit may not be happy about 
mandated wholesaling to their retail competitors, and so regulators must step in to 1) mandate 
wholesaling, 2) establish a wholesale price, 3) regulate the terms and conditions of service, and 4) ensure 
that conduit owners do not engage in anticompetitive conduct in their vertical markets. In other words, 
advocates would like the FCC to regulate this portion of the Internet just like the FCC regulated the old 
Bell System telephone monopoly. For those of us around at the time, we know that did not go so well, and 
it is likely to be a really bad idea to re-apply that tactic to the Internet, no matter how pure our intentions 
may be. 
 
But if it works for France and Japan,
47 why shouldn’t it work for America? Why should we be 
afraid of a little regulation if the outcome is positive for broadband deployment? Perhaps many economists 
regard regulation with suspicion, but if the bottom line is more and better broadband, then too bad for the 
economists; bring on the regulation and mandated unbundling. 
 
There are two reasons why mandated unbundling is a regulatory cul-de-sac, both of which are 
supported by strong empirical evidence: 1) it won’t work in the U.S., and 2) it will inhibit investment and 
competitive entry into the platform market. 
 
Mandated Unbundling . . . We’ve Been Here Before 
 
The Telecom Act of 1996 instructed the FCC to open the local exchange telephone market to 
competition by mandating local loop unbundling (LLU) of the local access lines owned by the incumbent 
local exchange carriers (ILECs). The FCC spent several years and many court cases before the rules for 
LLU were in place, and several more years of court challenges, during which the ILECs and their 
competitive counterparts roamed the FCC arguing their respective cases with Commissioners and staff. As 
the rules settled down and the court challenges subsided, the market for competitive local exchange 
carriers (CLECs) using LLU peaked at about 25 million subscribers in 2005, but their numbers have been 
in decline (along with ILEC lines) since then, down to about 17 million subscribers today (compared to 130 
million ILEC lines). 
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in these countries. One reason (among many) is that the government is the largest shareholder in the 
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The tremendous legislative and regulatory effort spanning more than a decade to obtain 
competition through LLU in the U.S. has resulted in a market share for CLECs using LLU of about 11% of 
the wireline market. This highly regulatory model for introducing competition seems to have produced a 
rather modest result. But we can only conclude this if we have a non-regulatory, market-based 
benchmark with which to compare it. Do we have any evidence that the market can do better than the 
regulated LLU solution at introducing competition? Does the market for platforms outperform the 
unbundling solution, and what evidence do we have either way? 
 
Fortunately, there are two natural experiments that have occurred over the past few years. The 
first is the introduction and extraordinary growth of wireless telephony, and the second is the introduction 
of VoIP, a service provided through a broadband provider. It has been argued that wireless voice is a 
complement to wireline voice, not a substitute for it, and so it does not really act as a competitor to 
wireline voice. But for customers who have a wireless phone but not a wireline phone, wireless really is a 
competitor to wireline. It is these customers who have opted for a market solution for wireline voice 
competition rather than the regulated CLEC alternative. The first natural experiment is to compare the 
number of subscribers with wireless only with the number of CLEC lines. The second natural experiment is 
to compare the number of VoIP customers with the number of CLEC lines. Putting the two together, I 
compare the total number of subscribers using market-driven substitutes (wireless only and VoIP) for 
wireline voice with the number of lines using the regulatory substitute (CLEC) for wireline voice. The 
results are shown in Table 1. 
 
             Table 1. Line Counts for Wireless Only, VoIP, and CLECs.  
 
Wireless Only  VoIP  Total  Market-
Driven Lines 




49 70,907,444  16,993,000
50 4.17 
 
The evidence compels us to accept that, for the Holy Grail of telephony, competition in the access 
line market, platform competition bested the regulatory unbundling solution. Market-based competition 
has yielded more than four times the results in wireline voice than did regulatory unbundling. Why would 
we think this would be any different for the Holy Grail of broadband? As a nation, we have tried regulatory 
unbundling and given it our best shot; it has come up far short of platform-based market competition. 
Let’s try to not make the same mistake twice.
51 
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A second model for wholesale broadband is for the government to build a broadband network 
which would offer no retail ISP services, but instead sell capacity wholesale to ISPs and others. Such a 
network has been proposed recently for Australia by Prime Minister Rudd;
52 private parties could invest in 
the venture, but the government would retain at least 51% ownership. The proposed fiber network would 
reach 90% of Australian households at speeds of 100 Mbps and cost US$31 billion. The basic benefit 
would be that, if the government owned the network, then it could support a wholesale-only model. An 
analogy would be the American interstate highway system, in which the government builds and maintains 
the highway infrastructure which any private party can access with automobiles and trucks. 
 
Does it make sense for any government to deploy such an extensive fiber network at this time? 
After all, the U.S. deployed the interstate highway system, why not a Federal broadband infrastructure? A 
recent article by Cleland (2009) debunks the idea, at least as applied to the U.S.; I need not repeat the 
arguments here. But two obvious points are evident after a moment’s thought: 1) We already have a 
broadband network that reaches at least 92% of the nation’s homes. Do we really need another one that 
is estimated
53 to cost around $430 billion? And 2) broadband is an evolving technology; locking in, say, a 
fiber network today could look pretty silly if in eight years 70% of households are accessing the Internet 
via broadband wireless. By contrast, highways were and are a mature technology that would not become 
obsolete after the interstate system was finished. 
 
In fact, the experiences of France, Germany, and Japan are instructive, in that the government of 
each of these countries is the largest shareowner in the incumbent telecommunications firm. These 
countries actually entered the broadband era with a quasi-governmental facilities provider which they 
converted to a wholesale model by decree. Further, the platform competition between cable and telcos 
that we have in the U.S. is virtually non-existent in these countries. Government control of the telcos in 
each of these countries made below-cost, mandated wholesale virtually the only model to provide any 
broadband competition at all.  
 
It does not appear that a government-owned or controlled wholesale broadband infrastructure 
would make much sense at the current stage of broadband development in the U.S.. 
 
This should not be taken to mean that municipalities or local citizens’ groups should be 
discouraged from entering the broadband market. While the experiences of municipalities providing 
broadband have been rather disappointing, groups of citizens may well find it useful to provide broadband 
locally. Indeed, many WISPs began as rural cooperatives, and there is no reason that underserved areas 
shouldn’t be expected to provide for themselves, either under the aegis of local government or not. The 
Federal government should not discourage this entry where customers demand it; in fact, there are 
programs established by the Department of Agriculture’s Rural Development Telecommunications Program 
                                                                                                                                                 
abandon this approach of separation and unbundling.  His recommendation is based on his empirical 
research reported in Noam (2009a).  
52 As reported in The Wall Street Journal (2009). 
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to assist in local rural broadband initiatives, either privately or cooperatively owned.
54  A further discussion 
on support for rural broadband continues below. 
 
Transparency . . .  the Sine Qua Non of Competition 
 
This paper has argued that a vibrant competitive market for broadband (indeed, for any product 
or service) ensures that customers will have a choice-rich market environment, as well as that multiple 
providers competing for customers’ business will offer a variety of features and functions from which 
customers will be able to choose their preferred bundle. In such a world, I have argued that there would 
be no need for the FCC, application providers, network providers, pundit and academics, consumer 
advocates, and various other interest groups to tell customers what’s good for them. In a choice-rich 
market environment, customers can choose for themselves, and in doing so, America will have the best 
possible plan: the one that people have chosen for themselves. 
 
But having many firms competing for customers’ business is not all that is needed. Customers 
need to know what each firm is actually offering in the way of service: terms, conditions, exactly what 
they are delivering. They need to know if their network provider is managing traffic and, if so, how. They 
need to know what the rates for service are, as well as the terms; if their provider will cut off their service 
if they use “too much,” what exactly does “too much” mean, and how can the customer track it?  They 
need to know if their network provider has signed special deals with certain application providers to give 
them better or faster service, or perhaps a prominent place on their Web site (“preferred provider”).
55  
And they need to know if certain Web sites are not accessible via their ISP.  Blocking Web sites may be 
quite beneficial, such as those that are known sources of viruses and worms, or that specialize in illegal 
activities, such as child pornography. However, there have been instances in which a network provider 
blocked the Web site of a union with which the company was engaged in a labor dispute,
56 or others in 
which a provider blocked/delayed specific applications for asserted reasons of network management.
57 
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56 See Austen (2005).  
57 In a very high profile case in 2007, Comcast was found to have delayed some BitTorrent traffic (a P2P 
service primarily used for sharing video files, such as movies). Comcast claimed it did so in order to 
manage the capacity on its network during peak periods. The allegations garnered so much publicity 
that the FCC launched an investigation, as reported in Paul (2008).  Eventually, the parties were able to 
reach a mutually satisfactory agreement; see McCullagh (2008).  I have recently argued that, had 
Comcast been more transparent about its practices, this incident would likely have played out very 
differently, most likely more favorably to Comcast, BitTorrent, and most important, to their mutual 
customers (Faulhaber, 2009).  Whether the both the procedures that the Commission followed in 
investigating the Comcast matter and the application of applicable policies were consistent with law is a 
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Additionally, some application providers have demanded that network providers pay them in order to be 
made available to the providers’ customers.
58 
 
Only if network providers are transparent in their customer terms and conditions will customers 
be able to make informed choices. Having lots of competition does not necessarily lead to a choice-rich 
environment. If customers are confused because firms are not forthcoming about what it is that they are 
actually selling and what it is that customers are actually buying, then competitive choice is severely 
blunted. In order for the competitive model to work as advertised, customers must be fully informed and 
able to choose. Only then can we count on competition to produce customer-value-enhancing results and 
yield a national broadband industry that is best for America. 
 
To some extent, the market should even be able to solve this problem. For example, if one firm 
has a customer-friendly practice, and its competitor’s related practice is very customer-unfriendly, the first 
firm has an incentive to advertise this difference and so inform customers. Of course, such advertising can 
invite reprisal, and it can become difficult for customers to sort out the arguments. So, as a practical 
matter, such advertising is rather rare. 
 
Transparency should apply not just to network providers, but to application providers as well. 
Recently reported events involving application providers include Web sites that have used customer data 
without their knowledge (much less explicit permission) for “behavioral advertising,” in which a customer’s 
online behavior is used to target advertising to that customer. The privacy problems inherent in behavioral 
advertising have attracted the attention of the Federal Trade Commission, which has issued guidelines 
regarding online behavioral advertising (2009a). In 2007, Facebook, the popular social networking site, 
changed its privacy policy to permit more sharing of customer information with advertisers (among other 
changes). There was an immediate outcry among customers, orchestrated by the political activist group 
MoveOn.org, and Facebook immediately backpedaled on their policy.
59   
 
There is a role for the government in ensuring that network providers and application providers 
— and indeed, all other Internet service providers — are fully transparent to their customers. As a matter 
of public policy, transparency from all players is the sine qua non for competition to have its desired 
effect. 
 
The Internet is not the only industry in which transparency is important for the competitive 
market to work well; indeed, full and accurate information is a requirement for any market to function 
well. Economists refer to this potential market failure as information asymmetry, a condition in which 
consumers may know much less about a product than do its producers, and may make ill-informed 
                                                 
58 ESPN360 is a Web site that carries overseas sporting events, either live or recorded. It blocks customers 
of network providers that have not paid for its service; the customers themselves have no option to pay 
for the content directly. See Wikipedia (2009c). I tested this on Mediacom Cable High Speed Internet 
and was able to access ESPN360, but I was denied access when using Comcast Cable High Speed 
Internet (although I understand that Comcast has recently agreed to pay for ESPN360). 
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judgments and choices as a result. This is a quite legitimate area of regulation, and virtually all industries 
have some form of control over how they label their products and the claims they can make. Why should 
the Internet industry, including both network providers and application providers, be treated differently? 
 
There is a long history of Federal and state consumer protection, much of it involving consumer 
labeling. Even highly complex products can be successfully labeled so that customers are well informed. 
Consider prescription drugs; these are highly complex products which demand a medical degree to be fully 
understood (if then), and yet customers need to be aware of the risks and benefits of each drug they use. 
To do so, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) has developed a customer-friendly and usable labeling 
system.
60 The main risks are listed in brief on the label of the drug’s container, and the full list of 
indications, risks, and dosage are listed in an extensive package insert. Should a customer wish for more 
information than is on the label, it is available in full detail in the package insert. Additionally, pharmacies 
also provide a level of benefit/risk detail when they dispense the medication, usually with telephone 
numbers to call for further information. If drug customers are not informed about the effects of their 
medication, it is not for lack of trying on the part of the FDA. 
 
Additionally, the FDA and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) have developed clear and succinct 
nutrition labeling for all packaged food sold in the U.S., listing calories per serving, protein, carbohydrates, 
sugar, cholesterol, etc. in a clear, uniform format (Food and Drug Administration, 2009). If food 
customers are not informed about the nutritional value of the packaged food they eat, it is similarly not for 
lacking of trying on the part of the FDA. 
 
The agency most directly tasked with consumer protection is the FTC, which has always been in 
the forefront of consumer labeling.
61 The FTC is the agency that sets standards for the conditions under 
which firms may use “Made in USA,” or “organic,” or “fair trade certified.” They also have required 
commercial Web sites to post their privacy statements online. The FTC and the FCC have successfully 
cooperated in creating and managing the National Do Not Call Registry, so there is institutional experience 
in such a cooperative effort. Ensuring transparency in dealings between network and online service 
providers and their customers may also be an appropriate subject for a similar cooperative effort. 
 
What are the key attributes of transparency? First, information must be communicated clearly 
and succinctly to customers, in language they understand. Second, the content must be relevant and 
meaningful to the decisions that customers must make.  That means information ought to be presented in 
a form more readily understandable than the software industry’s notorious End User License Agreement 
(EULA) that is largely incomprehensible to anyone without a J.D., but to which all customers must agree 
before they are permitted to access the software. Privacy policies and network management practices 
should also be readily accessible to customers. Network operators and application providers have taken 
steps in this direction, but more could be done in terms of standardization and readability. 
 
                                                 
60 For a full description of the FDA prescription drug labeling requirement, see the Food and Drug 
Administration Center for Drug Evaluation and Research (2008). 
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For instance, it may be helpful if the government could set standards for both the content of 
privacy policies as well as the format, so that (like packaged food labeling) customers could know what to 
expect. Perhaps the FDA drug labeling model could be used: a brief and usable statement directly on a 
Web site of the most important privacy issues, with a link to the “package insert”-style description of the 
details of the policy. 
 
Similarly, the government could consider setting standards for the content and format of network 
providers’ policies (again, perhaps with a brief description and a link to a complete, detailed description) 
so that customers can quickly learn what the network providers are actually providing. Is the network 
provider using network management? Under what conditions? What is the pricing policy? Under what 
conditions will the network provider reduce a customer’s bandwidth, or even bump them off the network? 
Are certain Web sites blocked? Which ones? Does the network provider offer faster/preferred service to 
some application providers? No doubt, the FCC could be very helpful in determining what items ought to 
be disclosed. 
 
Specifying an appropriate government role in ensuring transparency helps the industry as well as 
the customers, in that each firm can be assured of a level playing field with regard to disclosure. Clearly, 
the industry itself must be involved in establishing the transparency standards, as well as technical 
experts and actual customers. 
 
Another mechanism that could be helpful would be for the FTC/FCC to establish a list of questions 
(FAQs) that firms should be able to answer for their customers. Every firm could prominently link to this 
standard FAQ list, in which they would provide answers to these standard questions. Standardization of 
the FAQs would be helpful to customers’ understanding; firms could add Q & As if they wished. 
 
For the application provider market, the FTC has already directed some effort toward this (in 
requiring stated and public privacy policies). More needs to be done, though, as privacy issues become 
more salient to customers. For the network provider market, it would appear that questions generally 
related to net neutrality are those most in need of transparency. If customers are to decide between and 
among non-discrimination, blocking of certain Web sites, network management practices, and business 
arrangements with application providers to provide differential service and access, then they need to know 
exactly what the various providers’ policies are. 
 
Is there a legitimate economic role for such intervention in promoting transparency? The market 
failure of asymmetric information is well-known and described in basic economics textbooks. The role of 
the government in seeking to correct this market failure is also well-known and is institutionalized in such 
agencies as the FTC and the FDA, and it applies across a broad swath of industries. The call for 
transparency for both network providers and application providers in the broadband market is neither 
more nor less than what we expect our government to do to correct this market failure. 
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It is worth noting, yet again, that the role of the government in encouraging transparency is to 
solve the information asymmetry problem, so that customers can make informed choices.
62 It is not to 
make those choices for them. If a particular network provider, for example, offers its customers 
aggressive spam, worm, and virus blocking, as well as aggressive network management, it is not up to 
the government to forbid it from doing so. It is the role of the government to ensure that customers are 
fully aware of these firm policies and can choose to accept them or move their custom to a competitor.  
Likewise, if an application provider collects personal information from customers and shares it with 
“trusted” third parties, it is not up to the government to forbid it from doing so. It is the role of the 
government to ensure that customers are fully aware of these firm policies and can choose to accept them 
or move their custom to a competitor. It is the customers’ choice, not the choice of regulators, legislators, 
network or application providers, pundits, advocacy groups, law professors, or business school professors. 
   
Antitrust and Regulation 
 
Is competition plus transparency enough to ensure a choice-rich market environment for 
customers? Almost, but not quite. For this plan to function properly, a third component is required: 




In this environment, vigorous antitrust enforcement is important, particularly during the 
transition in the broadband network provider market from only two providers to more facilities-based 
providers (most likely, wireless broadband). During this period, it is of special concern that incumbents 
not engage in anticompetitive practices that may throttle newly emerging competition. The Obama 
Administration has signaled its intent to pursue vigorous antitrust enforcement. But it has been clear that 
the focus is not on protecting competitors, but on “the protection of consumer welfare,”
63 according to 
Christine Varney, the new head of the Department of Justice Antitrust Division. Antitrust protects the 
customer by protecting the competitive market; as stated on the Federal Trade Commission’s (2009b) 
Web site, “The . . . Bureau of Competition champions the rights of American consumers by promoting and 
protecting free and vigorous competition.” And free and vigorous competition is all about customer choice. 
 
Antitrust principles should not deter firms from aggressively competing, but it should deter firms 
from undermining the competitive market. Competitors who are unable to successfully establish a market 
position because they are out-competed have no antitrust beef. However, network or application 
incumbents who attempt to monopolize the market through anticompetitive practices should expect a visit 
from the DoJ’s Antitrust Division.
64 
 
                                                 
62 The new Administration is likely to be tougher on privacy issues, as reported in Hansell (2009). 
63 As reported in Lohr and Helft (2009). The article goes on to describe the new strategy of antitrust 
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64 In an agreement between the DoJ and FTC announced in 2002, the DoJ has clearance authority over 
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Additionally, there are provisions for private antitrust suits, so that a party who believes they are 
the victim of anticompetitive practices may sue the alleged offender, with the incentive of possible treble 
damages. In an industry subject to regulation, the viability of private antitrust suits has been called into 
question by the recent Verizon v. Trinko case.
65  But private antitrust suits can still be a viable means of 
disciplining errant incumbents in any industry. 
 
Regulation    
 
In an industry with platform competition on its way, full transparency enforced on all Internet 
industry segments, and vigorous antitrust activity to protect customers against anticompetitive actions, 
what role is there for regulation? 
 
The key role for the FCC will be creating the market infrastructure in which this desired state of 
affairs can evolve and blossom. This certainly includes putting much more spectrum to auction, so that 
wireless broadband has the room to expand, as the market participants are so anxious to do. It also 
includes working with the FTC to establish guidelines for transparency; the FCC alone has the technical 
and industry expertise to know what features of broadband network providers and application providers 
customers are likely to need to know. It must also stand ready to assist the DoJ with technical and 
industry expertise in pursuit of antitrust activity. 
 
But it is not the role of the FCC to decide for customers what they ought to want. Network 
Neutrality?  A favorite policy of many advocates, certainly, but neither the advocates nor the FCC should 
decide whether or not customers want net neutrality; it is up to customers. If net neutrality turns out to 
be highly desired by many customers, then in a competitive market, there will be at least one firm who 
will offer it, and it will be successful. And if it is successful, other firms will emulate it. Similarly, if 
customers want non-discrimination, or spam blocking, or no network management, competition and 
transparency will yield this result. And they will do so, not out of the goodness of their hearts, nor out of 
their belief in the sacrosanct dictum of Internet openness, but rather because it is in their own commercial 
self-interest to do so.
66 
 
But aren’t some regulations a good idea? Absolutely. I argue above for rigorous transparency 
regulation and rigorous spectrum management regulation. But all regulations that effectively constrain the 
behavior of firms must, of necessity, reduce their earnings, thereby reducing their incentives to invest (for 
incumbents) and reducing incentives for entry (for new entrepreneurs). This is a very simple proposition; 
if a regulator constrains a firm to do things it otherwise would not do, or prohibits it from doing something 
                                                 
65 See, for example, Phil Weiser (2005). 
66 A principle that dates back to the father of modern economics, Adam Smith:  
 
It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker, that we expect 
our dinner, but from their regard to their own self-interest. We address ourselves, not to 
their humanity but to their self-love, and never talk to them of our own necessities but 
of their advantages. (Smith, 1776)  768 Gerald R. Faulhaber  International Journal of Communication 3(2009) 
it would like to do, then whatever beneficial result might follow, the costs of the firm are increased or the 
revenues of the firm are reduced, or both. Otherwise, firms would have chosen to do it without regulatory 
compulsion. Thus, earnings will be lower, investment will be cut back, and entry will be deterred. From a 
policy perspective, this means less broadband; less competition; and therefore, less choice for customers. 
 
If the benefits which accrue from a regulation promise to outweigh the costs, then, by all means, 
adopt the regulation. But the test should be rigorous and experience-based. For example, I recommend 
above regulations regarding transparency and provision of information to customers by both network 
providers and application providers. These regulations no doubt have costs; it is less costly to operate a 
business with no disclosure requirements. But full disclosure helps solve a market failure of asymmetric 
information, and experience in many industries (as discussed above) suggests that these regulations 
create far more benefit to customers than the costs they impose. 
 
However, imposing regulations that make customers’ choices for them is costly in several ways. 
For example, requiring network providers to open their networks to other ISPs is certainly costly for 
network operators. Beyond that, establishing a regulatory standard (for “openness”) freezes possible 
alternative architectures which may prove superior in the future. Additionally, and most important, there 
is the cost to the customer who no longer has the ability to choose, to make the trade-offs by which his 
preferences are expressed. Lastly, it increases the cost of entry into the network provider market. With 
such a proviso in place, would wireless broadband operators wish to enter such a market? Would they not 
be better staying in their current niche of the low-bandwidth mobility market? Our experience with 
unbundling telephone access suggests that it was a costly experiment with little benefit to customers, 
especially when compared with alternative means of bringing competition to market. 
 
Two studies suggest the cost of regulations in terms of entry and investment.  First, the 
Faulhaber-Hogendorn paper,
67 which models and estimates broadband market structure, examines the 
imposition of a regulatory constraint of “universal” coverage, and finds that this constraint delayed 
broadband rollout by several years and resulted in a monopoly broadband market, rather than the two or 
three providers that would occur without the regulatory constraint. The result of the regulation was 
marginally more broadband coverage, but with significantly higher prices and no competition. 
 
Second, an empirical event study by Eisenach, et al.,
68 examines the impact on the stock price of 
incumbent telephone companies on February 20, 2003, when the FCC voted to extend unbundling 
requirements for telco broadband (actually, permitting the states to impose it) after expectations that the 
requirement would be lifted. As a result of this unfavorable ruling, Eisenach et al. find that the combined 
market capitalization of the incumbent telephone companies dropped by $15 billion. This is strong 
empirical evidence that imposing a regulation makes the enterprise a less attractive business, both 
reducing incentives to invest in this now-less attractive business and reducing incentives for new entrants 
who may be subject to the same regulations. 
 
                                                 
67 Faulhaber and Hogendorn, op. cit. 
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Care must be the watchword in introducing regulations: Do they enhance customer choice? At 
what cost? What empirical or experiential evidence do we have that benefits outweigh the costs? In 
crafting a broadband national plan, the FCC must have compelling evidence that the benefits outweigh the 
costs of imposing entry barriers and investment barriers. 
 
 
Competition + Transparency + Antitrust = National Broadband Plan 
 
Putting together the three components makes for a viable national broadband plan. It is a plan 
based on the choices that the American people make themselves, not choices others make for them. It is 
a plan that puts the power and the decision-making into the hands of customers, one that ensures they 
have the choices they need to make the best decisions for their own welfare. It is a plan that is firmly 
rooted in the American tradition of competition and individual customer choice, and it harnesses the 
extraordinary innovative power of the private sector to serve the public good. 
 
But will it ensure that the U.S. moves up the league tables of the OECD to be #1?  The answer to 
this is simple: If U.S. customers want to be #1, then this will be a natural outcome of vigorous and 
vibrant competition. If they don’t, then it won’t happen.  Whether the U.S. becomes #1 in the OECD or 
other ranking may matter to pundits, but it may not matter much to regular Americans.
69 The value of a 
vigorously competitive market is that it reveals what customers actually want, not what pundits want. 
 
Some may have difficulty accepting this. It may be argued that the rather inhibiting fact that only 
74% of American homes own a home computer is a disgrace, and that we need to remedy this before we 
can expect more extensive broadband penetration.  It has been argued that perhaps some Americans 
really don’t know what’s good for them, and that we should do everything we can to get them to buy 
computers and sign up for broadband. Are we doing enough to ensure computer literacy in the U.S.? 
Certainly our public schools are familiarizing our young with computers, and certainly computer retailers 
and broadband providers have every incentive to educate the non-consuming public of the value of their 
wares. Most interesting is the role of local not-for-profits in overcoming the digital divide by encouraging 
computer literacy.
70 It is not clear that the Federal government will do a better job of increasing 
computer/Internet literacy on its own, relative to these other mechanisms. 
 
Other countries have used a mix of incentives and public sector supply to increase the use of 
computers and broadband. Robert Atkinson discussed the public policies of Sweden, France, Korea, and 
Japan to encourage computer and Internet literacy,
71 with measurable results. Perhaps the Federal 
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Americans don’t buy broadband.  The results suggest that bringing more citizens online may not be 
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Digital Impact Group, changing its focus from network provision to teaching computer and Internet 
literacy in low-income groups in Philadelphia.  
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government could establish a joint program with the computer and Internet industries (which have the 
most to gain) to increase computer/Internet literacy in the United States. Such a program would certainly 




What about innovation? Does it ensure that the Internet will continue to generate innovation, as 
it has in the past? Of course, no plan can guarantee that inventors will continue to invent, but it can 
guarantee that the Internet market will be innovation-friendly. And there is no better guarantee of this 
than competition. If innovators have multiple platforms across which they can introduce new products and 
services, they will be as well-served as customers by competition. Network providers should welcome 
innovators, as they add value to the network providers’ product, which is access to the entire Internet. 
 
What about pricing? Current pricing practices of ISPs feature “all-you-can-eat” pricing for 
customers, generally with higher prices for faster speeds and no pricing for application providers who 
access their customer through terminating broadband facilities. It is unlikely that this pricing practice is 
sustainable in the long run; the great disparity of customer usage makes a single price regardless of 
usage untenable. Also, we already see application providers charging network providers in the case of 
ESPN360; could other application providers be far behind? And what of network providers charging some 
application providers? Pricing Internet services is still in its infancy and will evolve, in my view, in the near 
future.
73 In a competitive market with transparency by all, whatever pricing structure emerges will have to 
be acceptable to customers (on both sides of the market) and reflect the underlying costs of doing 
business. We must not seek to lock in an early pricing practice; let this market evolve, and with 
competition and transparency, customers will be well-served. They will not be well-served if regulators 
lock in a particular pricing practice now.  
 
This is a national broadband plan that trusts the American people to make good choices for 
themselves. It is a plan that doesn’t have “experts” making decisions for ordinary people, and it doesn’t 
condescend to its citizens. It puts the information they need into their hands (transparency), it make sure 
they have enough choices (competition), and it protects them against anticompetitive actions (antitrust). 





                                                 
72 One might expect that, if resources are to be committed to educating the public on what’s good for 
them, one ought to start with encouraging good nutrition, discouraging the use of alcohol, tobacco, 
drugs, and credit card debt, and encouraging school children to do better in math and science. 
Broadband education might be fairly low in this list. 
73 Pricing is one of many economic questions regarding Internet market structure, including vertical 
foreclosure, two-sided markets, “preferred provider” contracts, and network management practices, all 
of which I discuss in Faulhaber (2007).  I conclude that the potential for anticompetitive practices 
requires antitrust vigilance, and that antitrust is a more suitable remedial mechanism than regulation. International Journal of Communication 3 (2009)   A National Broadband Plan for Our Future 771 
Rural Broadband 
 
If 92% or more of American households have access to at least one broadband provider, then it 
appears that the problem of broadband for rural America is maybe not so big. Perhaps, but also perhaps 
not if you happen to be in rural America, and you want broadband and can’t get it. Is this a large 
proportion of rural households? We don’t know. But it is for these folks that we seem to be offering 
subsidies to rural telephone companies and other providers (see American Recovery and Reinvestment 
Act, 2009). The idea seems to be that giving money to carriers to build broadband facilities will extend the 
reach of broadband (beyond the 92% of households that already have access to it), and that these 
households will actually want broadband and be willing to buy it. We are thus following in the footsteps of 
the traditional telephone Universal Service Fund, a fund which takes money from some carriers and gives 




Is there a more efficient way to subsidize rural people who may need broadband and either can’t 
get it or can’t afford it? As it turns out, there are several options. First, wireless ISPs seem particularly 
well-suited to rural areas. A most interesting case involves Stelera Wireless, a firm which has 45 rural 
AWS spectrum licenses, and which is offering broadband service in Floresville, TX and Ploth, TX, as well as 
Grand Junction, CO and nearby towns. Stelera was helped by a $35 million business loan from the 
Department of Agriculture’s broadband loan program, and these towns now have high-speed Internet 
access, thanks to an enterprising entrepreneur who has a business model,
75 some spectrum to work with, 
and a start-up loan from the Federal government. 
 
The second option is more unconventional, but it should be obvious once you put the customer at 
the center of a broadband national plan. If the problem is that customers are unable or unwilling to pay 
for costly broadband service, then give the money to customers, and let them make their choices. Giving 
money to carriers simply enriches carriers, with perhaps some small benefits redounding to customers. 
But giving money to customers explicitly for buying broadband puts them in the driver’s seat. How might 
this work?  Suppose we were able to give, say, $50/month to households who 1) lived in a rural ZIP code, 
2) had an adjusted gross income less than $X, and 3) bought broadband service. Then, if a local wireless 
or cable company offered broadband at, say, $70/month (because it may be expensive to serve a sparsely 
settled area), and if the problem has been affordability, the customer could choose to buy the service for a 
net of $20/month out of pocket (or at some other amount commensurate with what their urban cousin 
pays). If the problem has been that the cable or wireless ISP offers no service, then the government 
providing broadband support to an entire unserved community makes that community an attractive 
market; an ISP could now sell broadband for, say, $80/month (remember, rural service is costly to 
provide), with residents needing to only pay $30/month out of pocket. Putting broadband purchasing 
power in the hands of customers makes them attractive customers for network providers, perhaps even 
enough providers to give customers competitive choices. Now, if the problem was that some customers 
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neither wanted nor needed it, then it would make little sense to build a network to accommodate them, 
which would still be the outcome of using this direct-to-customer subsidy plan. 
 
How might the mechanics of such a subsidy work? Again, there are several options. Since the 
Department of Agriculture already has multiple subsidy programs aimed at rural areas, they could 
administer a plan in which rural customers would send their broadband bills to the Department receive a 
check in the mail. Alternatively, the rural broadband provider, after approval of the customers, could be 
directly reimbursed for a portion of each customer’s monthly bill. Perhaps a more efficient subsidy scheme 
would be to give each customer who lives in a rural ZIP code, and whose income is below some cutoff, a 
Federal income tax credit. Broadband providers would issue the equivalent of a Form 1099 each year (also 
reported to the IRS) that would verify that the taxpayer had purchased broadband and was entitled to the 
tax credit. Since the IRS already manages a dizzying array of tax deductions and credits, they have the 
administrative skills and capacity to manage this subsidy program. 
 
This broadband subsidy program is similar to the telephone Lifeline program, which provides a 
subsidy of up to $10/month, with eligibility determined state by state. There are maximum income 
requirements to participate. Of course, this is an income-specific program, not a rural-specific program, 
but the principle can apply equally well for a rural subsidy. This program is paid for from the Universal 
Service Fund. 
 
Last, the problem of the “middle mile”: “Backhaul” is the transmission of data/voice from an ISP 
or cell tower to an Internet Point of Presence or other network gateway. In rural areas, this typically 
means using a facility such as fiber or microwave from a small town to a larger city, perhaps dozens of 
miles distant. There may only be facilities owned by an incumbent; because of very limited market size, 
competitive alternatives are too costly. As a result, high backhaul costs may pose a significant barrier to 
entry and expansion of service for rural ISPs. This problem may impact independent rural mobile 
providers, as well as rural ISPs. 
 
Fortunately, the market for backhaul systems and services for both mobile providers and ISPs 
appears to be improving. Noteworthy is Verizon’s aggressive wholesale marketing of fiber and Ethernet 
backhaul facilities, via its wholesale subsidiary Verizon Partner Solutions.
76 This is especially interesting, in 
that an incumbent telecommunications firm is offering wholesale services for good business reasons, 
rather than because of mandated wholesaling. Although these initial indications regarding emerging 
competition for backhaul in rural areas are promising, the FCC and antitrust authorities should be vigilant 
for anticompetitive practices in this market. 
 
An interesting and welcome development is the introduction by Rep. Anna Eshoo (D-CA) of the 
Broadband Conduit Deployment Act of 2009 (op. cit.) which would require the Federal government to 
install plastic conduit suitable for housing fiber links along every Interstate highway as it is repaired or 
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backhaul technologies, such as T1, do not have sufficient bandwidth to handle 4G services. Many other 
companies offer wireless backhaul equipment and services. International Journal of Communication 3 (2009)   A National Broadband Plan for Our Future 773 
rebuilt. Should this conduit be made available at low cost to any carrier (including independent ISPs), the 
substantial backhaul barrier to entry in rural areas would be removed, at least where conduit is deployed.  
 
A customer-centric rural subsidy follows directly from the principle of giving the customer the 
power to make his or her own decisions. It promises efficiency gains, because only customers that want to 
buy broadband will actually sign up for the subsidy, and it effectively targets rural areas, especially those 
in need. It reverses the logic of the FCC’s classic supply-side subsidy model of giving money to firms in 
hopes that customers will benefit, substituting a demand-side subsidy model of giving money to a 




The central principle of this paper is that, for a national broadband plan to fulfill the needs of 
Americans, it must be customer-centric; the plan must put customers at its center, enabling them to 
make the decisions about what they want and what they need — not regulators, not legislators, not 
pundits, not consumer advocates, not interest groups, not legal scholars, and not even business school 
professors. The role of regulators is to create a choice-rich market environment for customers, 
according to these four principles: 
 
1.  Encourage broadband competition by auctioning lots of licensed spectrum, at least 1 GHz. 
Wireless firms have already strongly signaled their willingness to enter the broadband market in 
significant numbers; the most significant barrier to entry is the availability of licensed spectrum, 
one that it is well within the power of the FCC to remove forthwith. After large amounts of 
licensed spectrum are placed in the market, expect a fully competitive market to emerge within 
five years. 
 
2.  Establish transparency regulations for all players in the Internet market, both network providers 
and application providers. Full disclosure requirements are best established and administered 
through joint effort of the Federal Trade Commission and the FCC. Disclosure should, first and 
foremost, be designed to communicate the terms and conditions of service and privacy to 
ordinary customers clearly and completely. 
 
3.  During the transition to full competition, antitrust vigilance guarding against anticompetitive 
conduct is important to ensure that competition is not throttled. Antitrust is designed to protect 
competition, not competitors. We expect fierce competition for customers’ business. Weak 
competitors may die as a result, and that’s OK. The Department of Justice should, and will, focus 
on ensuring that the marketplace remains competitive. 
 
4.  Focus rural and low-income subsidies on customers who are in need of help, not on companies. 
This ensures that subsidies go only to those in need who actually want the service, increasing 
both the efficiency and the effectiveness of the rural subsidy program. While this might appear 
obvious, it is almost an 180º change in approach from traditional telephone subsidy programs. 774 Gerald R. Faulhaber  International Journal of Communication 3(2009) 
Deployment of broadband access has already resulted in 92% coverage of American households, 
so it appears that the rural deployment issue is manageable. 
 
Regulation needs to be focused on creating a market infrastructure in which competition among 
firms is the order of the day. Customers win, innovators win, and firms win. Regulators will do what they 
can do best, as described in the four points above. Similarly, private firms will do what they do best, which 
is bringing services and technologies to customers; a competitive market with transparency ensures that 
customers will get what they want and need. 
 
Focusing on where America stands in international “rankings” of broadband is a fruitless 
distraction. What matters to this country is that Americans should get the broadband they want — not 
what the French want, not what the Koreans want, not what the Japanese want; what Americans want. It 
is up to the FCC to build a national broadband plan that lets Americans choose the broadband they want. International Journal of Communication 3 (2009)   A National Broadband Plan for Our Future 775 
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